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Introduction 
Following Brexit, the UK will need to agree a new set of trading arrangements with the 
remainder of the European Union (EU27 hereafter). The UK and the EU have strongly re-
oriented their trade towards each other and created deep interconnections between their 
economies. Many commentators and sectoral bodies argue that preserving as much as 
possible of this favourable access should be an important goal in any Brexit settlement. 
Concluding a very ambitious trade agreement is also a stated goal of both the UK government 
and the EU – HM Government (2017b): Part IV, and European Council (2017): Part IV para. 
20. 
In its White Paper of February 2017, the UK government stated its intention to leave the EU 
Single Market (SM) or Customs Union (CU), and that remains the position of the leadership 
of both main political parties. Staying in the CU would necessitate maintaining common 
external tariffs, going against its ‘red line’ on controlling its own trade policy. And the UK  
red line on restricting the immigration of EU nationals cannot be reconciled with continued 
membership of the SM, of which free mobility is an integral component - see Gasiorek, 
Holmes and Rollo (2016). But while giving up on the CU and the SM, UK political parties 
still say they wish to retain the same access to European markets as they have now! The EU 
will not permit this, but it is worth exploring whether in return for moderation in restricting 
migration, the UK could preserve most of the benefits of the CU and SM in key sectors?  
The CU and SM play a role in the current free circulation of goods within the EU, a degree of 
integration far exceeding that attainable through any simple tariff-free Free Trade Area 
(FTA). The CU ensures zero tariffs between members and a common external tariff, which 
means that intra-EU borders posts are not required either to levy tariffs or to enforce rules of 
origin. The SM, which underpins the ‘four freedoms’ of movement for goods, capital, 
services, and labour contributes further through regulatory harmonisation, which ensures that 
goods may be exported without requiring additional certification, that customs procedures are 
harmonised, and that many services can be traded without hindrance through approaches such 
as ‘passporting’ for financial services and mutual recognition of professional qualifications.  
Approximating this level of market access for goods would require agreeing a zero-tariff Free 
Trade Area (FTA), and then agreeing to apply identical tariffs on imports from third countries 
in certain sectors that could support relaxed rules of origin and a very light customs 
procedure between the UK and EU.  Also, the UK and EU would need to conclude mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) in certain sectors. For services, the UK and EU would need 
to secure an agreement only for certain services sectors, and then accredit/authorise bodies to 
certify equivalence of services, ie qualifications or banking procedures. 
Clearly, a necessary condition for creating this relatively deep level of integration is political: 
the UK and the EU27 must agree that it would be beneficial. In addition, however, both 
parties are members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and so any trade agreement 
between them must also be compatible with WTO rules and practices. For both goods and 
services, WTO rules and practice require that agreements be both wide (covering many 
sectors – but not necessarily all) and deep (offering meaningful liberalisation of trade). This 
rules out apparently politically convenient solutions such as selective tariff reductions or 
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granting special market access solely for some companies. However, the rules are drafted and 
applied in such a way that the depth of the mutual liberalisation can vary significantly across 
sectors: that is, the UK and the EU27 could design a de facto WTO-consistent trade 
agreement that went some way towards preserving current trading conditions in a subset of 
sectors. While the parties may not be able to reach such agreement, they should not dress 
political failure up as legal impossibility. 
There are caveats, however. First, selective tariff harmonisation will not eliminate all border 
delays; absent a full CU and SM some checks will be needed to verify that goods are covered 
by the deep agreements and that they comply with tariff and regulatory requirements. Second, 
to relax or abolish RoOs (i.e. create CU-like conditions in a sector), the UK and EU would 
need to coordinate their tariffs on relevant goods and all their significant inputs. Moreover, 
this applies not just to MFN tariffs but to all (existing and new) third-country FTAs as well. 
Even absent a formal CU, such an arrangement would still constrain the UK’s discretion in 
determining its own trade policy. Third, given that many products, from tomatoes to 
microchips, have dual or multiple end-uses, pursuing a CU for sector A would potentially 
spill over to sectors B, C, etc. Finally, the conformity of UK production with EU regulations 
is implicit at present (it is achieved by proving that the products comply with UK standards, 
which, in turn, are identical, or deemed equivalent to EU standards). This will now have to be 
done explicitly on a sectoral basis in order that the MRA can be signed in the first place, 
either by agreeing that regulation is equivalent, or the more limited approach of agreeing that 
UK companies would be authorised to certify that products met EU standards, and vice versa.  
Before we examine these issues, we first demonstrate that the elimination of trade barriers 
induced by membership of the CU and SM created a significant volume of trade between the 
UK and the EU, including to the formation of European value chains.  
 
Do Trade Arrangements Matter?  
The history of UK-EU trade suggests strongly that the CU and SM have had a profound 
influence on trade patterns and have directed UK trade toward the EU. To see the long-run 
trends, consider trade between the UK and the original European Economic Community ‘six’ 
– Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands. In 1968-70 – well before 
UK accession could be predicted – the UK sold 16% of its goods exports to EEC members; 
this rose to 36% by 1990-92 before declining to 33% by 2013-15, the latter reflecting the 
growing importance of Emerging Markets. To eliminate this relative market-size effect, 
consider the UK share of different markets’ imports: for the world as a whole, the UK share 
has fallen from 6.2% in 1968-70, through 4.9% in 1990-92 to 2.4% in 2013-15, whereas for 
the same periods the UK’s share of the EEC market evolved from 4.4%, through 6.9% and 
back to 4.4%. That is, from having a considerably smaller UK share than the world, the EEC 
countries have moved to having a share approaching twice as large.  
Figure 1 plots the ratio of UK’s share of all exports to the EEC to its share of world exports 
(in blue) and the EEC share of UK imports relative to the EEC’s share of world imports 
(broken, in red). At first the UK had a smaller share in the EEC than elsewhere (30 percent 
lower), and vice versa, but following accession, trade in both directions surged. By the mid-
seventies the UK and EEC had the same shares with each other as with elsewhere and by the 
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mid–eighties roughly 40 percent larger. Following a dip in the mid-eighties, the introduction 
of the Single Market over about 1988-1992, induced another surge, so that now mutual 
market shares are 75 to 100 percent above the norm.  
Trade agreements – of which the CU and the SM are extreme examples - usually increase the 
trade between members. Sometimes this can be at the expense of trade with non-members, 
but most evidence suggests that the creation of new trade is stronger than the diversion of 
trade from non-members to members. ‘Trade creation’ is particularly likely to dominate 
‘trade diversion’ when a Single Market is created. First, many Single Market regulations 
reduce the costs of doing trade and hence more trade becomes possible and profitable. 
Second, in many sectors, trade between the member and non-member countries barely existed 
initially because differences in standards and regulations prevented it. Thus the extra trade 
stimulated by the European SM arose as UK suppliers newly challenged domestic sellers in 
Europe, and vice versa. This increased competition benefited consumers and, in particular, 
users of intermediate imports – that is, as intra-EU value chains developed3. 
 
Note: the trade intensity index for UK imports from the EU is the share of UK imports from the EU 
relative to the share of all countries’ imports from the EU, and similarly for exports.    
 
WTO Rules and Practice on FTAs for Goods Trade  
With participation in the CU and SM eliminated from the menu, the options for the UK and 
EU trade relationship have narrowed. If they wish to continue preferential trade treatment, 
this will be classified for WTO purposes as a Free Trade Area. Any such FTA will have to 
comply with WTO disciplines on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs).4 RTAs enable 
                                                          
3 One possible concern over these figures is whether, post-1990, they have been influenced unduly by the 
reunification of Germany. The answer is ‘no’: exactly the same patterns are evident if we exclude Germany.  
4 The WTO utilises RTA as an umbrella term; agreements that fall under the WTO mandate include ‘all bilateral, 
regional and plurilateral trade agreements of preferential nature’ including the Customs Unions and other Free 
Trade Agreements that Articles XXIV GATT considers – WTO (1996).  
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countries to grant each other preferential market access. This contravenes the MFN principle, 
a core WTO commitment whereby Members agree to treat all other Members equally. For 
trade in goods, Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
provides an exception to the MFN principle.5 It enables RTA Members, organised into a 
‘customs union’, which has common external tariffs, or a ‘free-trade area’, which does not, to 
grant each other more favourable treatment as long as they meet established criteria. 
Primarily, RTA Members must not raise duties and other restrictive regulations to non-RTA 
Members (paragraph 5b), and must eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations on 
substantially all the trade between them (paragraph 8b).  
The GATT never fully enforced the provisions of Article XXIV. In recent decades, the 
proliferation of RTAs and their growing political and economic importance has continued to 
erode the appetite of the WTO to do so - see Winters (2015).6 The Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements, the WTO body which now oversees RTAs, is no longer charged with 
reviewing the consistency of RTAs with the GATT, but restricted to requiring members to 
provide information to allow one member to tell whether it will be adversely affected by 
another’s agreements. Further, WTO Members have almost never formally complained about 
each others’ RTAs through the dispute settlement system. In the handful of disputes that 
evaluate the WTO-legality of RTA provisions, the WTO Appellate Body has employed a 
limited and narrow use of the Article XXIV exception. It has never declared an RTA to be 
overall-GATT non-compliant.  
This is not to say, however, that Article XXIV has had no effect: even a rule that is 
commonly violated may reduce the extent of bad behaviour (think of speeding laws). The UK 
has set itself up as the champion of multilateralism and the WTO – Fox (2016) – and so 
would doubtless wish to be among the most rule-abiding members of the WTO. Furthermore, 
the EU is also rule-abiding and takes into account Article XXIV requirements in its FTA 
negotiations (see below). 
 
Applicability 
There is no dedicated WTO provision pertaining to the situation in which a customs territory, 
which the EU comprises, is replaced by an FTA. Instead, Article XXIV’s 4th paragraph 
establishes the purpose of RTAs as ‘increasing freedom of trade’ by ‘closer integration of the 
economies of the countries parties to such agreement’. Replacing a customs territory with a 
less liberal arrangement goes against this requirement. 
However this does not mean that a UK-EU FTA would contravene Article XXIV. We argue 
that, rather than comparing the FTA with the current customs territory, MFN status should be 
                                                          
5 Interestingly it does so, however, not as an explicit exception to MFN but as a qualification to the definition 
of a customs territory, thereby reducing its political toxicity – see Winters (2015).  
6 According to the WTO website, as of 2016 all WTO Members are also RTA Members: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/scope_rta_e.htm 
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taken as the baseline, as the EU and UK would revert to this in the absence of a new trade 
agreement.7 In the recent Peru – Agricultural Products dispute, the Appellate Body stated: 
….In our view, the references in paragraph 4 to facilitating trade and closer 
integration are not consistent with an interpretation of Article XXIV as a broad 
defence for measures in FTAs that roll back on Members' rights and obligations under 
the WTO covered agreements - WTO (2015), para. 5.116.  
This statement underscores that WTO rights and obligations provide a minimum standard of 
liberalisation that FTAs should preserve. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding points to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (‘VCLT’) as a source of customary rules of treaty interpretation. VCLT Article 
31(1), which has frequently been cited in WTO dispute settlement, states that: ‘a treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’ [Emphasis added] – 
VCLT (1969). The employment of MFN status as a comparative baseline conforms with the 
object and purpose of Article XXIV. Article XXIV sets out a minimum level of liberalisation 
that RTA Members must attain to qualify for an exemption from the MFN obligations 
established in the GATT Agreement, which provide for closer integration than countries 
would attain without an FTA. As long as the EU and UK meet these requirements they are in 
compliance with its purpose of ‘increasing freedom of trade’. As set out in Paragraph 7, 
Article XXIV also brings about transparency and enables WTO oversight of RTAs; 
supporting the EU and UK notification of their FTA will facilitate this oversight. On this 
basis we believe that WTO Members can be persuaded to accept this unconventional 
approach. Practically speaking, the WTO has no formal authority to constrain the UK’s 
choice to leave the EU and it is highly unlikely that WTO Members would protest on the 
basis that the UK and EU have not achieved closer integration, as meeting this requirement is 
impossible. 
 
Requirements 
As stated above, Article XXIV contains two key restrictions on FTAs. Countries can 
constitute such areas if:  
the duties and other regulations of commerce maintained in each of the constituent 
territories and applicable … to the trade of contracting parties not included in such 
area …  shall not be higher [than] prior to the formation of the free-trade area. 
(Paragraph 5(b)).  
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce … are eliminated on substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories. (Paragraph 8(b)) 
                                                          
7 The adoption of such a baseline could be purely notional (imagining that one second elapsed between the 
dissolution of EU Membership and the conclusion of the FTA) or could be established by a very brief period of 
operating such a policy. 
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Paragraph 5(b) requires that a UK-EU FTA should not result in increased tariffs or other 
regulatory barriers to third countries. This precludes either party increasing its bound tariff 
rates. There are very few cases where an FTA has increased the restrictions on imports from 
non-members, possibly because the latter could so easily complain. Turkey’s raising of 
external tariffs prompted complaint in the only dispute in which the Appellate Body found a 
Member not in compliance with Article XXIV, Turkey – Textiles - WTO (1999). The UK has 
indicated that it will ‘replicate as far as possible our current position as an EU Member State’ 
- HM Government (2017a): para. 9.18. On past precedent, the EU27 would not seek to 
change its concessions on signing an FTA – at least not upwards. Thus this condition is 
unlikely to cause problems. 
Paragraph 8(b) has two components – the elimination of duties and other regulations between 
partners and the coverage of substantially all trade. Again, the former ought to cause little 
problem for a UK-EU FTA. The parties currently trade with no tariffs. If cooperation was 
great enough to negotiate an FTA in the first place, we might assume that there would not be 
any serious pressure to introduce them in any post-Brexit FTA. And by virtue of the Single 
Market (SM), UK-EU trade currently faces very low levels of other restrictive regulations. 
The issue is that asserting UK regulatory independence by leaving the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), and trading off migration controls for SM access will lead both 
parties to want to pull back from the current degree of integration in at least some sectors. No 
FTA has the depth of regulatory integration that the SM provides, and many make few efforts 
to reduce other restrictive regulations – Epps (2014). Thus it seems that even with a fair 
degree of retreat from the SM, a UK-EU FTA would more than satisfy WTO practice to date 
as long as the retreat is not spread too unequally across the sectors, a point to which we now 
turn. Again we argue that WTO MFN status, rather than the SM, should act as a comparative 
baseline.  
The second element of Paragraph 8(b) is its coverage of ‘substantially all the trade’. Years of 
discussion through GATT and WTO working parties, the Uruguay Round of trade 
negotiations and the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) have not 
resolved the definition of ‘substantially all’. Key debates centre around whether the definition 
should be quantitative (and if so what percentage8), qualitative, or on a case-by-case basis, 
and whether an FTA excluding agriculture can constitute ‘substantially all trade’.9 The 
Appellate Body in Turkey—Textiles decided that the ordinary meaning of the term 
‘substantially’ contains qualitative and quantitative elements, with the latter emphasised in 
relation to duties. It characterized ‘substantially all’ as not the same as all but considerably 
more than some - WTO (1999): paras. 48-49. Despite formulating these concepts, the 
Appellate Body refrained from applying them to an assessment of whether Turkey’s customs 
union covered ‘substantially all’ trade with the EU as defined by Article 8(b), as the Parties 
had not appealed the Panel’s ‘assumption’ that the EU and Turkey were in compliance – 
WTO (1999): para. 60.  
In the absence of judicial guidance, examining the practices of WTO Members is helpful. In 
its FTAs with developed countries, the EU defines ‘substantially all’ as 90 per cent of its 
                                                          
8 Proposals generally range from 80 to 90 per cent – see Sauve and Ward (2009), 22.  
9 See, eg, debate in Committee on Regional Trade Agreements regarding the FTA between Canada and EFTA – 
WTO (2010 b). 
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trade being tariff-free (Woolcock, 2007: 5).   Given a starting point of zero tariffs on mutual 
trade and the EU’s (and hence the UK’s) low MFN tariffs, a UK-EU FTA seems likely to be 
able to achieve this threshold quite easily. 
What paragraph 8(b) does clearly rule out is sectoral deals whereby UK-EU trade in a few 
specific sectors received better terms than MFN. This restriction has two implications. First, 
the arrangement which the UK government reached with the car producer Nissan in order to 
persuade them to continue investing in the UK would not be WTO-consistent if it included 
any tariff concessions.10 This principle is made clear in the 2000 dispute Canada – Autos. 
Canada granted import duty exemption to vehicle manufacturers affiliated with 
manufacturers in Canada; upon joining a free trade agreement with the US in 1989 it closed 
the list of eligible manufacturers. The Appellate Body found that Canada was not in 
compliance with the Most Favoured Nation principle of GATT Article I:1 as it granted an 
advantage only to some products from some Members – WTO (2000b): paras. 73-84.  
The second implication is that a UK-EU FTA cannot be constructed piece-meal, starting with 
narrow coverage and adding sectors as they are negotiated. The criterion must be satisfied 
from the start, although further sectors can then be added subsequently. 
 
Transitional arrangements 
Article XXIV contains separate classifications for free-trade areas and interim agreements 
leading to, or necessary for, the formation of a free-trade area. Free-trade areas are defined in 
paragraph 8 as agreements in which ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce are 
eliminated’, suggesting that negotiations should be concluded. In practice, however, countries 
do not declare free-trade areas under negotiation to be interim agreements, but rather full 
agreements with transitional periods.11  
Such transitional periods normally facilitate a move from trading conditions A to trading 
conditions B over a period of time, where B is known; this is partially managed by clauses in 
the Uruguay Round ‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV …’.There is an 
important difference, however, between this type of transitional period and the increasingly 
recognised need for a transitional arrangement for UK-EU trade.12  
In the UK-EU case, a transitional deal is necessary because it is most likely that within the 
two-year period effectively allowed for negotiating UK exit from the EU, there will not be 
time to agree, let alone sign and ratify, a comprehensive trade agreement.13 That is, the UK 
and EU will not know precisely what trading conditions B actually are and hence will not be 
                                                          
10 Holmes (2016) discusses possible arrangements for the vehicle sector.  
11 Note that WTO-notified interim agreements are also subject to more oversight with respect to plan and 
schedule than full agreements. As stated in paragraph 7b, if WTO Members find that an interim agreement is 
not likely to result in the formation of a free trade area, they can make recommendations; parties to the 
agreement are obliged ‘not [to] maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such agreement if they are not 
prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.’  
12 An early argument that transitional arrangements would be necessary is in UKTPO (2016) published in July 
2016. 
13 This timetable has been discussed in Szyszczak and Lydgate (2016).  
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able to submit an FTA text to the WTO. If, however, there is broad political agreement that a 
trade agreement will eventually be reached, there are two alternatives. Either UK-EU trade 
reverts to MFN status until it is agreed so that tariffs are increased for a period, only then to 
be reduced to zero again when agreement is reached. Or the UK and the EU seek a waiver 
from the WTO membership to continue UK-EU tariff-free trade for a finite period. Waivers 
are granted on the basis of consensus of WTO Members. While some might see the 
opportunity for short run mercantilist gains from insisting that UK-EU trade impose tariffs 
and then remove them, none can claim that permitting a waiver to avoid this negates their 
reasonable expectations from a previous agreement. Moreover, many would potentially lose 
if the UK and EU economies were seriously disrupted. Hence – as has just been revealed 
(Miles, 2017) - UK and EU diplomats ought to be cooperating to make the case for a waiver.   
Of course, even a simple goods-only FTA will not be possible unless both sides are willing.14  
The UK and the EU would need to work together to persuade the rest of the WTO 
membership to take a sympathetic view of the need for a transitional arrangement while they 
worked out the details of the FTA and of the fact that a UK-EU FTA will be unwinding trade 
liberalisation rather than extending it. In the subsequent analysis we assume that a substantial 
tariff-free FTA can be achieved, and consider how much further the EU and UK can go in 
maintaining benefits of the Customs Union and Single Market.  
 
Can individual sectors approach Customs-Union-like access? 
The critical difference between a customs union (CU) and an FTA is that the former allows 
goods, once inside the area, to circulate without facing any additional tariffs, as they will 
have faced the same tariff wherever they entered the CU. The latter cannot do this. If one 
member of an FTA has a zero tariff on, say, apples, while others have positive tariffs, 
exporters would seek to send their apples to the first country and serve the others from there. 
To avoid this ‘trade deflection’, FTAs have rules of origin (RoOs) to determine whether a 
good has been produced within a member country, in which case it is exempt from tariffs 
under the FTA agreement, or whether it has been produced outside, in which case it has to 
pay the tariff of the country of destination.  
Applying a RoO is straight-forward for simple goods like apples, but most manufactured 
goods are produced by combining many inputs, some of which may come from third 
countries. In these cases, the RoOs can be complex, but typically a product needs to contain 
60% local value added to be eligible for duty free import into the EU under the European 
Economic Area agreement and we might anticipate the same rule for the UK. Enforcing such 
RoOs means customs checks between the EU and the UK even in an FTA. These could be 
minimal if exporters are well-known to the customs authorities and their production methods 
have been inspected in advance. But even then there is the cost of periodic inspections and 
random border checks. Moreover, while such a solution is feasible for large flows - the cost 
of establishing origin is mainly a fixed cost which can be spread over a large volume of sales 
- for small, and even more so, one-off transactions, such an approach is not realistic and the 
                                                          
14 From shortly after the referendum, UKTPO Fellows have stressed the premium on diplomacy in achieving an 
effective Brexit – see, for example, Lydgate, Rollo and Wilkinson (2016). 
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bureaucratic costs and resulting uncertainty can be proportionately very high – even 
prohibitive. 
This raises the question as to whether, if the UK and the EU agreed to maintain the same 
external tariff on a specific final good and all the significant inputs into it, that final good 
could be spared intrusive RoO procedures; that is, whether for a specific sector, customs-
union-like conditions could pertain within an FTA?15 Note that this would not address trade 
frictions associated with regulatory barriers, addressed in the subsequent section.  
There is no WTO regulation that precludes two countries from having the same external tariff 
on a specific good, nor from co-ordinating to achieve that end. Indeed, providing that, as the 
UK government intends, the UK adopts the EU’s existing external tariffs, the trade partners 
will have de facto tariff coordination. Moreover, since preferential rules of origin within an 
FTA are essentially a matter between the partners (despite the fact that they may impose costs 
on other WTO members – see, for example, Krueger, 1999), there seems to be no barrier to 
their agreeing to express and operate those rules in a way that imposes rather little cost on 
market transactors. Thus, it is, in principle, possible to create customs union-like conditions 
for specific sectors within an FTA.16 
One area where these considerations are particularly significant is food and agriculture. In 
sectorally-incomplete customs unions, agriculture is often the excluded sector (eg, the 
Turkey-EU customs union), due to the political sensitivities of opening agriculture to tariff-
free trade. In the current case, however, there is already tariff-free trade between the UK and 
EU, and some incentive to maintain harmonised external tariffs.  UK accession to the EEC 
(EU) was associated with a significant increase in protection for agricultural markets and was 
followed by a fair degree of trade diversion of UK imports from third countries to EU 
sources. These sales are presumably attractive to EU farmers and hence, because of the 
latter’s substantial political clout, EU policy makers. Even if an FTA agreement ensured that 
the UK imposed no tariffs on imports from the EU, EU producers would lose if the UK 
liberalised its agricultural imports from other suppliers. Thus the UK may be able to offer a 
significant concession to the EU by agreeing to maintain its agricultural protection at pre-
Brexit (i.e. EU) levels, while exempting imports from the EU from tariffs – that is, by 
maintaining the status quo. Such a policy would suit the UK’s farm community, and UK 
consumers might hardly notice it because it would merely fail to engineer a decline in food 
prices rather than raise them directly. Thus one can see its political attractions. We certainly 
do not advocate any particular policy in this area, but if it were concluded that such an 
outcome were desirable as part of the overall outcome of Brexit, it would not fall foul of 
WTO rules.  
On the other hand, this approach implies a good deal of coordination. First, many goods have 
a large number of inputs and tariffs on all of these would need to be harmonised, including 
any preferential rates that are offered as part of FTAs with other countries or unilaterally to 
developing countries. Second, there may be issues about inputs into those inputs: thus one 
                                                          
15 The high level of co-ordination and harmonisation among EU customs authorities was actually introduced 
under the Single Market programme – Leave Alliance (2016) - but it is designed to give effect to the benefits of 
the customs union and could, if desired, be continued without the SM architecture.  
16 Also since no tariffs would be changed if the UK and EU adopted this strategy, there would be no violation of 
Article XXIV.5(b) that an FTA should not increase protection levels against third countries.  
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might exempt tomato ketchup from RoOs if tomato paste faced the same tariff in both 
partners, but if one member produced tomato paste locally from imported tomatoes the other 
partner might wish to know that those tomatoes were facing the same tariffs as it imposed on 
its imports. Third, inputs such as tomatoes, may have uses in other end products, and the 
tariff chosen for the sake of the sectoral coordination may not be at all appropriate for those 
other users. That is, because tariffs cannot be varied according to the end-user, the tariff on 
any good needs to balance the interests of the sector seeking customs-union-like access with 
those of other sectors. Fourth, the more open two markets are to each other, the more 
businesses agitate to ensure that they face reasonably equivalent market conditions for non-
traded inputs such as, say, electricity, or even for labour (migration?). This sort of problem 
besets any agreement to reduce barriers to mutual trade and was, indeed, one of the pressures 
towards deeper integration within Europe17. Many such differences are tolerated de facto, but 
when potential partners are large like the UK, maintaining very open borders may be made 
conditional on some maintaining sort of equivalence. That is, deep trade integration may be 
sustainable only with constraints on other areas of policy.18  
A more fundamental shortcoming is that the requirement that even preferential tariff rates 
need to be coordinated if customs-union-like conditions are to prevail, effectively requires the 
UK and the EU to have FTAs with precisely the same set of third countries and to have pretty 
much identical conditions for the relevant goods.19 This strikes at the notion of an 
independent UK trade policy. For example, the EU allows Korean exports of goods tariff-free 
access, and if the UK did not, it would presumably want to impose RoOs to ensure that EU 
production using high proportions of Korean inputs could not freely enter the UK given the 
competitive advantage they would reap from cheaper inputs. This, of course, would 
undermine the customs-union-like conditions in that sector.  
Finally, while it would certainly benefit firms to avoid RoO certification, the extent to which 
this arrangement would actually manage to circumvent border delays is uncertain. Border 
checks will likely need to be introduced for many products transiting between the UK and the 
EU. Even if a given product doesn’t require RoO certification, it may still be subject to 
queues while other products are checked and verification that they actually qualify for 
customs-union-like treatment.  
 
                                                          
17 A telling illustration is the Commission’s insistence that before it would remove possibility anti-dumping 
policies on the countries of Central Europe, the latter would need to adopt almost of the acquis communitaire 
– the body of EU (then EC) law: ’once satisfactory implementation of competition and state aids policies (by 
the associated countries) has been achieved, together with the wider application of other parts of Community 
law linked to the wider market, the Union could decide to reduce progressively the application of commercial 
defence instruments for industrial products from the countries concerned’. European Commisssion (1995), 
emphasis added 
18 Thus, for example, paragraph 20 of the EU’s Negotiating Brief of Article 50 states that outcomes should  
‘encompass safeguards against unfair competitive advantages through, inter alia, tax, social, environmental 
and regulatory measures and practices’. 
19 The alternative that the final and all the intermediate goods covered by a sectoral agreement were excluded 
from EU and UK FTAs with others is not workable: it would rapidly create more exemptions than were 
compatible with Article XXIV, it would complicate those FTAs, and for all the FTAs that currently exist, the EU 
has already committed to include those sectors in the FTA. 
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Regulations 
Tariffs are far from being the only friction in international trade – meeting regulatory 
conditions and proving that you have done so are in many cases far greater barriers to 
commerce -World Economic Forum (2013). Addressing these was the purpose of the 
European SM, and as we have argued above, its progress seems to have had a material effect 
on the volume of trade and degree of competition within the EU. In this section we ask 
whether, as part of an FTA, the UK and the EU could agree to maintain SM-like conditions 
on specific sectors or whether doing so would violate any WTO non-discrimination rules. 
The question is not whether the UK could remain part of the SM on exiting the EU. It is, 
rather, whether it could have SM-like access in selective sectors.  
 
Mutual recognition 
The EU has harmonised a great deal - but not all - of its Members’ standards for product 
safety and public protection. Goods regulated by standards that are not harmonised still 
circulate freely due to the principle of mutual recognition – European Parliament and Council 
(2008). Products from EU and EEA countries, as well as Turkey, are automatically exempted 
from national technical regulation. Unless a country can prove that an imported product does 
not meet its standards on public safety, health or the environment, it is assumed that standards 
are equivalent.20  
Although the principle of mutual recognition applies to non-harmonised Member State 
legislation, it comprises an essential component of the ‘four freedoms’ of the SM: the right to 
free movement of goods. It was established in order to ‘complete’ the internal market such 
that goods would travel as freely as they would in a national market; all EEA and EU 
countries are bound by the Mutual Recognition Regulation which gives effect to the 
principle.21 
The extension of the principle of mutual recognition to Turkey confirms that it can be 
extended to non-SM countries. Turkish mutual recognition applies to the goods covered by 
the CU, but with certain exceptions such as pharmaceuticals – EC-Turkey Association 
Council (1996), para. 66; European Commission (2014) 106. (And, of course, the CU does 
not cover all goods.) This seems to suggest that the UK may be able to benefit from the 
mutual recognition principle, exempt some sectors from coverage, and not establish a CU 
with the EU. (On the latter, note that participating EEA countries do not have a CU with the 
EU.) However Turkey has agreed to align its legislation with the EU acquis in the areas 
covered by the CU.22 It is difficult to imagine that the UK would be exempted from the 
                                                          
20 ‘Mutual Recognition’, European Commission website at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market/goods/free-movement-sectors/mutual-recognition_en 
21 ‘Free Movement of Goods’, European Parliament website at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.2.html 
22 The acquis is the entire body of rights and obligations binding on EU Members. European Commission 
website at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en  
The most recent WTO Trade Policy Review for Turkey documents its ongoing efforts to adopt the EU acquis - 
WTO (2016).  
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requirement to conform with the acquis in covered sectors, thus compromising its regulatory 
self-determination.  
Less comprehensively, the EU and UK could agree to mutual recognition of goods on a 
sectoral basis. In general, the EU views the extension of MRAs for regulation to third 
countries as part of a larger process of harmonisation and market integration with the EU. 
While there is no promise that partner countries will eventually become EU Members, it will 
only undertake such MRAs in sectors where the regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures are aligned with the EU – Correia de Brito et al., (2016) 19.  
As members of the Single Market, the EU and UK currently have standards that are identical 
or deemed to be perfectly equivalent; indeed, their common history could offer cover for the 
EU and the UK favouring each other with quick agreements of a sort that other parties have 
been negotiating for years. More complex will be devising a dispute settlement system that 
precludes the CJEU having jurisdiction in the UK and creating arrangements that assure 
consumers and producers that standards and assessments will be mutually acceptable into the 
indefinite future, so that longer-term investments become possible. Most of that 
accommodation will have to come from the UK, as a much smaller market, but it might be 
eased by agreeing a forum or consultation procedure which obliged the EU to discuss future 
regulation changes with the UK. Clearly, however, a technical regulation MRA that either 
side could rescind on short notice offers a lot less long-term assurance than a legal 
requirement enforced by the CJEU, and so even if regulations do not change and there are 
consultation procedures, co-operative outcomes that were achieved under the Single Market 
may no longer be sustainable even under a very cooperative Brexit. That is, after Brexit one 
has to expect that some of the existing harmonisation of standards and mutual recognition 
will unwind.  
 A third option that better accommodates this unwinding is to negotiate Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) on conformity assessment procedures. CAPs determine that the 
requirements imposed by technical regulation or standards have been fulfilled. They establish 
that EU product inspection, testing and certification can be done in the third country and vice 
versa. Such MRAs are more modest in ambition; they do not require that equivalence be 
established but simply avoid duplication in testing.  
However they do necessitate the Conformity Assessment Body in country A to be 
knowledgeable of the regulatory requirements of country B, and capable of fulfilling them, 
and vice versa. This requires a high level of mutual trust. While CAP mutual recognition 
promises to maintain EU regulatory requirements in foreign products and vice versa, even 
achieving this more limited goal has proven difficult. For example, negotiations between the 
US and the EU to grant mutual recognition of pharmaceutical inspections, such that a EU 
facility could produce a US-approved drug and vice-versa  have taken years to conclude. 
Differences in drug approval procedures were difficult to overcome and the US was reluctant 
to concede that EU producers could meet its safety standards. In practice negotiations have 
included working toward areas of mutual standardisation - US Food and Drug Administration 
(2017); Van Norman (2016). The EU has succeeded in concluding MRAs in a few sectors 
with some countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the US and Switzerland, 
though many of these have been problematic or only partially functional in practice - Correia 
de Brito et al., (2016) 80.  
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The UK and EU have established trust in one another’s CAPs already, which gives them a 
major advantage. If the UK were so willing, it is unlikely that it would object to conformity 
assessments conducted by EU laboratories. Having accepted EU standards for sales in the 
EU, its offensive interest will be to ensure simple and quick conformity assessments in the 
EU or, better, that UK laboratories could certify UK goods for the EU.  
 
Would UK-EU MRAs on goods be compatible with WTO obligations? 
As previously established, mutual recognition can establish that rules are equivalent 
(technical regulation MRAs) or that firms in both countries are capable of undertaking each 
others’ conformity assessment procedures (CAP MRAs). Both types of agreements must 
comply with MFN provisions set out in the GATT, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement). If the regulations or CAPs covered under the MRA meet 
established criteria to be classified as ‘technical’, the TBT Agreement will apply; unlike the 
GATT, it contains articles on conformity assessment procedures. MRAs concerning food 
safety, animal and plant health regulations fall under the SPS Agreement. Disputes on MRAs 
would almost always fall under the more specialised provisions of the TBT or SPS 
Agreements. However to complete the analysis we consider the GATT as well.  
 
GATT compliance 
With respect to the GATT, UK-EU sectoral MRAs, either on technical regulations or CAPs, 
are subject to compliance with its MFN principle, Article I:1.23 A third party could complain 
that it was excluded despite having an equivalent ability to achieve a particular standard. 
GATT Article I:1 requires that Member States should provide equality of competitive 
opportunities for imported products from all WTO Member States. This is a ‘market based’ 
test, which does not take into account the policy justification of a discriminatory measure (see 
EC – Seal Products, Appellate Body Report, para. 5.82). For this reason, in many cases the 
exclusion of a petitioning third country from an MRA would contravene Article I:1.   
A Member State has never defended an MRA under Article XXIV, but the Article makes 
clear that regional liberalisation is the aim of RTAs (paragraph 4) and requires that RTA 
members should remove regulatory barriers between them (paragraph 8b). The case law 
establishes a high threshold for applying the Article XXIV exception. The Appellate Body in 
Turkey – Textiles concluded that members of a customs union could act inconsistently with 
GATT provisions only if ‘the formation of that customs union would be prevented if it were 
not allowed to introduce the measure at issue’ -WTO (1999b): para. 58. It applied this 
criterion in assessing the applicability of the Article XXIV exception in justifying Turkey’s 
introduction of additional trade barriers to third countries. It is not entirely clear whether the 
same high threshold would apply to removing trade barriers between trade partners through 
MRAs in an FTA. If such a test were applied, the UK and EU would be required to establish 
                                                          
23 Article I:1 requires that ‘…. any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.’ 
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that the MRAs were necessary for the FTA to be concluded. This is complicated by the fact 
that there are certainly FTAs that achieve tariff reduction but no mutual recognition 
whatsoever.  
Even if the UK and EU were able to argue that MRAs were necessary for the FTA, the 
Appellate Body would be hesitant to apply the Article XXIV exception as it is not available 
under the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement will act as lex specialis in many MRA 
disputes. The Appellate Body would want to avoid the asymmetry of providing an exception 
for regional integration that applied only when a disputed MRA happened not to be 
adjudicated under the TBT Agreement. Thus it is unlikely that a country could defend 
excluding a third country from an MRA under the Article XXIV exception.  
Instead it would need to take recourse to GATT Article XX General Exception, which 
permits trade-restrictive measures that fall under listed public policy objectives, eg human 
health and conservation of natural resources, if they fulfil additional non-discrimination 
criteria established in its chapeau.24 A party to a closed MRA would need to establish that 
recognising third country regulation or conformity assessment would undermine its ability to 
uphold its desired level of protection in a regulatory area falling under the General Exception.  
Since the WTO was established there have been no Article I:1 disputes on MRAs. However 
EC – Tariff Preferences (2004) is instructive in some respects: it dealt with market access 
conditioned on achieving public policy goals. As part of its Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, the EU awarded preferential tariffs for 
developing countries if they met standards on protection of labour rights and the 
environment, as well as efforts to combat drug production and trafficking. India claimed that 
the EU was discriminating by providing tariff preferences to Pakistan and not to India. This 
dispute fell under the 1979 Enabling Clause which authorises extending more favourable 
treatment to developing countries as a category. The Appellate Body analysed whether the 
EU could provide preferential tariff treatment to some countries and comply with the 
Enabling Clause’s non-discrimination requirement. It considered whether the countries were 
similarly situated and had similar needs – WTO(2004a) paras. 154-165. The main element of 
the Appellate Body’s finding of discrimination was that the EC had a closed list of 
beneficiaries and there were no objective criteria or standards for inclusion on the list – WTO 
(2004a) paras. 187-189.  
An MRA dispute would differ in factual and legal respects, including that it would focus on 
comparability of regulatory bodies and approaches rather than domestic situations more 
broadly; the market access ‘reward’ would consist not just of lowering tariffs but ceding 
regulatory oversight. The Appellate Body would probably appreciate that the countries would 
wish to undertake a high level of scrutiny before allowing third parties into an MRA. 
Nonetheless it is likely that the Appellate Body would similarly require objective and 
transparent criteria in order to avoid ‘closed list’ MRAs.  
                                                          
24 Article XX exempts measures that fulfil a closed list of objectives including those ‘(a) necessary for public 
morals; (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; and (g) relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources…’.as long as they do not constitute ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade….’ 
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This interpretation is supported by disputes that have focused on equivalence more narrowly. 
In US – Shrimp the US required that its trade partners install a device on fishing nets to 
exclude, and thereby protect, sea turtles. In the context of the GATT Article XX chapeau, the 
Appellate Body found that the way that the certification was administered was unfair, as trade 
partners were not notified of whether they had been certified nor provided with the rationale 
or given the opportunity to respond – WTO (2001): paras. 163, 166, 172).  
Also, in a pre-WTO GATT dispute, EEC – Beef from Canada, Canada complained 
successfully that the EEC had violated the GATT MFN Principle – GATT (1981): para. 
4.2(a). The EEC specified a US product standard that met its definition of ‘high quality’ cut 
in its regulation, and noted only one certifying agency for the meat entering the EEC, which 
was located in the US. While finding this discriminatory, the GATT Panel also made clear 
that an important component of its decision was the fact that Canada could certify that the 
meat it proposed to export ‘met the exact product specifications required for access’.25 Thus 
the burden of proof fell on Canada to establish that it could fulfil the requirements to be 
automatically certified as meeting EEC product standards.  
Despite the lack of disputes on MRAs we can extrapolate an obligation on MRA parties to be 
objective and transparent, and parties seeking MRA membership to establish that they can 
fulfil the requirements of the regulator. These requirements would likely also be central in a 
dispute under the TBT or SPS Agreements, further considered below.   
 
TBT Agreement compliance 
The TBT Agreement contains dedicated provisions on technical regulation (Articles 2-4) and 
conformity assessment (Articles 5-9). The TBT Agreement’s MFN provision on regulation, 
Article 2.1, differs slightly in wording from GATT Article I:1.26 The implied obligation is 
substantively the same: to avoid providing more favourable treatment to some trade partners 
through closed MRAs not available to third parties with equivalent standards. TBT 
Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2 provide grounds to argue that regulation restricts trade in 
order to meet legitimate regulatory goals. TBT Article 2.7, a dedicated provision on technical 
equivalence, also provides a qualified obligation to ‘give positive consideration to accepting 
as equivalent technical regulations of other Members’ but only if they are satisfied that they 
‘adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations’. In this context, Schroder proposes 
that regulators should compare the equivalence of: the regulatory goals, the results of the 
regulation and the means to achieve the goals – Schroder (2011) 124. 
Article 6 on Recognition of Conformity Assessment Procedures parallels TBT Article 2.7 
though applying directly to CAPs. Article 6.1 states that Members shall accept different 
conformity assessment procedures ‘…provided they are satisfied that those procedures offer 
an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or standards equivalent to 
their own procedures.’ Article 6 recognises further conditions for acceptance that include 
negotiation (‘prior consultations’) to ensure confidence and reliability. The obligation is on 
                                                          
25 Ibid at para. 4.1.  
26 Article 2.1 requires that ‘Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products imported 
from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.’ 
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third parties to ‘offer an assurance of conformity’. Article 6.3 also states that Members ‘are 
encouraged’ to ‘enter into’ negotiations for CAP MRAs, but such Agreements must provide 
‘mutual satisfaction regarding their potential to facilitate trade’.  
 
SPS Agreement compliance 
The SPS Agreement places a more precise obligation for cooperation on importing countries. 
Article 4.1 requires that Members shall accept other Members’ regulations as equivalent if an 
exporting Member ‘objectively demonstrates’ equivalence; as under the TBT Agreement, the 
exporter must establish that its measures meet the objective, defined here as ‘appropriate 
level of protection’ as determined by the importing country, a requirement which is difficult 
to fulfil. Equivalence differs from mutual recognition in that it does not require bilateral 
assessment  - Schroder (2011) 142. Article 4.2 also stipulates that ‘Members shall, upon 
request, enter into consultations…’ to recognise multilateral or bilateral equivalence. Article 
4 was further clarified by a 2001 ‘Decision on Equivalence’, which requires countries to 
describe their objectives, desired level of protection and risk assessment procedures, and 
provide exporters reasonable access to relevant procedures – WTO (2004). Members must do 
this quickly without disrupting existing imports.   
There have been no complaints dealing directly with Article 4 violations. The legal status of 
the Decision on Equivalence is uncertain, though the Panel in US – Poultry has concluded 
that it does not bind Member States – WTO (2010a), paras. 2.5-2.16. Also, despite the 
exhortations of Article 4.2, establishing equivalence on a bilateral or multilateral basis has 
proven elusive in practice due to attachment to national regulatory approaches. For this 
reason equivalence agreements are few in number and often narrow in scope – Echols (2013) 
pp 97-99. As in the case of technical regulations, however, the integration of UK and EU SPS 
measures puts them well ahead of other trade partners with respect to these kinds of 
obstacles.  
 
Existing MFN obligations on the EU 
These MFN obligations also pose a challenge to the EU’s existing principle of mutual 
recognition. One possible line of defence is that, as a contracting party and customs territory 
in its own right, the EU is exempt from extending the treatment provided within the EU to 
third countries on an MFN basis. However such an argument would be undermined by the 
fact that products from Turkey and the EEA also receive automatic mutual recognition. 
Bartels (2009) concludes that the EU principle of mutual recognition contravenes GATT 
Article I:1. Further, he concludes, if the EU unjustifiably rejects a request from a third 
country to recognise the equivalence of its technical regulations or conformity assessment 
procedures this would violate the TBT Agreement. In order to bring the EU into conformity 
with these obligations, Bartels calls for it to make its principle of mutual recognition 
conditionally available to all WTO Members – Bartels (2009) 719-720.  Indeed, a move to 
negotiated, sectoral MRAs between the UK and EU – rather than comprehensive, automatic 
mutual recognition – would actually be more likely to comply with MFN obligations, as long 
as these MRAs were in principle open to other WTO Members.  
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In practice, the EU could maintain the exclusivity of its principle of mutual recognition 
simply by upholding the existing requirement that countries who wish to benefit must 
implement the EU acquis. However the deeper problem that this analysis reveals is the 
inadequate recognition in the TBT and SPS Agreements that regional integration necessitates 
a greater level of regulatory harmonisation than that available to all WTO Members – see 
Howse (2015). Instead, countries must resort to defending closed MRAs on the basis that 
other countries cannot meet their regulatory standards. Yet in practice the WTO has not 
presented any obstacle to regional regulatory integration, simply because there have been no 
WTO complaints on the principle of mutual recognition as applied by the EU, nor on 
negotiated sectoral MRAs in the EU or more broadly. It is unclear whether there is tacit 
acceptance of the exclusivity of the EU SM, or whether requests for equivalence from third 
countries will arise imminently, as Bartels (2009) predicted. From a legal realist perspective 
it is difficult to imagine that the WTO dispute settlement bodies would want to undermine the 
functioning of the SM. 
 
Services and GATS Article V 
Services trade agreements are governed by GATS Article V, which differs from Article 
XXIV in that it does not refer to Regional Trade Agreements but rather to ‘Economic 
Integration Agreements’ (EIAs)27. Also, GATS does not distinguish between customs unions 
and free trade areas: most services are not subject to tariffs and border measures, rendering 
the distinction meaningless. The objective of Article V, as implied by paragraph 1, is ‘an 
agreement liberalising trade in services.’ As it is more or less inevitable that a UK-EU EIA 
would remove some of the services liberalisation currently available, it would not meet this 
minimum threshold, such that the UK and EU would need to establish a different baseline. 
The obvious way of doing this is to utilise WTO GATS schedules applied to all WTO 
Member States.  
The legal constraints imposed by the WTO in negotiating a sectoral deal for trade in services 
are similar to those for goods. GATS Article V operates mutatis mutandis to GATT Article 
XXIV. Parallel to GATT Article XXIV(5)b, paragraph 4 prohibits Members from raising 
barriers to trade in services for non-Parties to the EIA. The Article also, in paragraph 1, 
requires broad sectoral coverage and non-discrimination; the extent of its reach in both 
instances hinges around the interpretation of the term ‘substantial’. The basic requirements 
for compliance with Article V have not been precisely codified by Member States nor subject 
to interpretation by the Appellate Body.  
 
Substantial sectoral coverage 
Rather than GATT Article XXIV’s ‘substantially all trade’, Article V requires ‘substantial 
sectoral coverage’. The footnote to paragraph 1a states that this is constituted by number of 
sectors (implying that not all sectors need to be covered), volume of trade affected and modes 
of supply, and that there should not be a priori exclusion of any of the four modes of supply. 
The modes are 1) cross-border supply; 2) consumption abroad; 3) commercial presence; and 
                                                          
27 In the WTO’s RTA database, agreements that cover both goods and services are flagged as both “FTA & EIA”. 
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4) presence of natural persons.  Other than in Mode 1, the value of services trade cannot be 
straightforwardly quantified still less simply added up; this explains the emphasis on 
liberalisation across sectors rather than simpler ‘substantially all the trade’ that pertains to 
goods RTAs. Despite this relative carefulness in the treaty text, it is still not clear which 
elements of trade in services (sectors, trade volumes, modes of supply) require quantitative 
and which qualitative assessment and, as with goods, precise thresholds have not been 
established. There is nothing to prevent a very uneven approach to liberalisation within the 
different modes, as long as no Mode is entirely excluded. In most EIAs there is greater 
ambition within modes 1 and 2 than in mode 3, and mode 4 commitments are often only 
marginal - Cottier and Molinuevo (2008) 133-4. Further, even if a sector is listed, this would 
still allow the possibility that commitments extend only to one sub-sector of the committed 
sector – see Wang (2012), 427.  
 
Substantially all discrimination 
Within the sectors that are included in the ‘substantial sectoral coverage’, EIA members must 
eliminate ‘substantially all discrimination’ by providing national treatment as described in 
GATS Article XVII; namely, treating ‘like’ services of EIA members no less favourably than 
domestic ones. This can be seen as a vertical requirement: within the covered sectors there 
must be depth of liberalisation.  
The requirement to eliminate ‘substantially all’ discrimination indicates that some subsectors 
can be exempted. But it is unclear how deep EIA Members must go vis-à-vis existing GATS 
commitments to non-discrimination. Paragraph 1(b) contains two very different thresholds. It 
states that EIA members can eliminate substantially all discrimination by ‘eliminating current 
discriminatory measures and/or prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures’ [emphasis 
added].  Eliminating all discriminatory measures suggests near total merging of the domestic 
market with the foreign market(s): there would be no discriminatory barriers e.g. to cross-
border sales, consumption abroad, establishing firms and movement of persons. Simply 
prohibiting new or more discriminatory measures, on the other hand, suggests that a standstill 
will suffice: avoiding ‘GATS-minus’ outcomes.28 Article V prohibits discrimination ‘in the 
sense of GATS Article XVII’, which only applies to specific commitments identified by 
WTO Members in their GATS schedules. These commitments can be further limited to 
specific circumstances or exempt some measures.  
The use of the word ‘or’ cannot be ignored. However, it seems difficult to imagine that an 
EIA that contained only standstills would meet the drafters’ intentions. Paragraph 1 makes 
clear that EIAs liberalise trade in services, a point echoed by the Panel in Canada - Autos – 
WTO (2000a), para. 10.271. An interpretation suggested by Cottier and Molinuevo is that the 
first obligation should apply to sectors in which there are many discriminatory measures and 
the latter to sectors where there is little discrimination – Cottier and Molinuevo (2008) 136-
137. But the message for countries negotiating EIAs is that Article V does not establish a de 
jure requirement to eliminate all discriminatory barriers.  
                                                          
28 See Adlung (2015) on GATS-minus clauses in RTAs. They are not as rare as one might expect.  
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Another unsettled area concerns market access commitments. WTO Members determine 
which of their service sectors will be subject to GATS Article XVI commitments to removing 
six categories of mainly quantitative restrictions on foreign services and capital. The text of 
Article V does not mention Article XVI, suggesting that it does not apply. However there is 
no clear line separating market access from non-discrimination commitments and in practice 
there are overlaps – see Muller (2016). Also, the WTO Secretariat has considered reduction 
of market access barriers as contributing to the liberalisation achieved by an EIA; see eg 
Factual Presentation of the EU – Korea FTA – WTO (2012).  
The dispute settlement bodies have enforced the non-discrimination requirement only once, 
in a Panel finding that was not appealed. The Panel in Canada – Autos concluded that 
Canada’s conditioning of access to an import duty exemption could not be justified under 
GATS Article V:1 – WTO (1999a): paras 10.269–10.272. The exemption was awarded within 
only one sector: vehicles. Within that sector it was awarded only to a small number of service 
providers associated with companies which met particular export criteria. Canada argued that 
the measure could be defended as part of an FTA (NAFTA), but the Panel decided it failed 
meet the requirement of eliminating substantially all discrimination, asserting that members 
of an EIA should not discriminate between service suppliers (Panel Report, para. 10.270). 
Clearly, singling out some service providers for duty exemption within a particular sector in 
an EIA contravenes GATT Article V. Note that this decision applied to the sector in question; 
the Panel did not conclude that NAFTA as a whole contravened GATS Article V.  
 
GATS and Mutual Recognition 
GATS Article VII addresses MRAs in services; Article VII:2 includes the tentatively-worded 
obligation that a party to an MRA “shall afford adequate opportunity for other interested 
Members to negotiate their accession to such an agreement or arrangement or to negotiate 
comparable ones with it. “Article VII.3 also provides for non-discrimination ‘in the 
application of … standards or criteria for the authorisation, licensing or certification of 
services suppliers.” There have been no disputes to elaborate these provisions and it has been 
speculated that the lack of disputes is because the ‘burden of persuasion’ for third countries to 
establish that they should receive better than MFN recognition is perceived to be too high - 
Marchetti and Mavroidis (2010), 423.    
 
Assessing the GATS compliance of a UK-EU EIA 
Given the uncertainty about how to interpret the GATS’ legal provisions on EIAs and the 
absence of any rulings from the Appellate Body, we turn to the actual practice of members 
and Secretariat for guidance. This is clearly not definitive about how a UK-EU EIA would be 
viewed, but precedent does carry some weight in WTO proceedings as does, in the case of 
assessing RTAs and EIAs, the old adage that ‘people who live in glass houses should not 
throw stones’.  
As noted above, the WTO review procedure is now restricted to the Secretariat providing 
information to members, from which they can draw their own conclusions. The information 
that the members seek and the Secretariat provides through this process may be taken as a 
reasonable guide to what they consider important in making an assessment. Even ignoring the 
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points above that a sector is covered if even only one sub-sector is included in the 
liberalisation and that ‘eliminating substantially all discrimination’ does not mandate 
precisely national treatment in all covered sectors, actual practice appears to offer 
considerable comfort to the notion that an EIA with the depth of integration varying over 
service sectors would be acceptable to the WTO membership. We base this view mainly on 
the Secretariat’s Factual Presentation of the EU-Korea FTA (WTO, 2012) but that on the 
EU-Peru FTA (WTO, 2013) suggests similar criteria. 
We start by considering schematically a single service sector, such as health provision, 
banking or telecoms, and imagining that the degree of restriction can be collapsed into a 
single scalar measure, which we represent on the vertical axis of Figure 2(A). (We avoid for 
now the vexed question of how to aggregate the degree of restriction across modes of 
supply.) No country fails to regulate these sectors internally – that is, national suppliers are 
required to obey some (generally perfectly justifiable) restrictions on their behaviour. We 
denote this ‘national’ in the figure. At the other end of the scale, a WTO member must record 
in its GATS schedule the maximal amount of regulation that it will impose on services and 
service providers from abroad, up to and including infinity – i.e. provisions that explicitly or 
effectively ban trade. As Borchert (2016) has observed, however, there is very considerable 
binding overhang, so that applied policies towards services imports are typically more liberal 
– impose less regulatory constraint – than scheduled commitments. Both of these levels apply 
on an erga omnes (MFN) basis. In addition, within the EU, and often as part of the Single 
Market there is a further level of regulation – that accorded by one EU member state to 
another, which we label ‘EU partners’. This may be the same as required of nationals – as, for 
example, in financial services whereby establishment in one member state is sufficient to 
have a ‘passport’ to operate in another – or more restrictive – as, for example, with the 
provision of legal services in which several members states impose residence/nationality 
requirements – European Commission (2017). It will never exceed, however, the restrictions 
offered at the MFN applied level29.  
Now suppose that the EU signs an EIA which defines the level of regulation that will pertain 
to imports from the UK. This might be anything from merely confirming the GATS schedule 
to offering identical conditions to those facing nationals, but if the EIA is to mean anything it 
will require that in at least some sectors the level of regulation is below that offered on an 
applied basis to all WTO members. Further, because the Single Market is so deep – 
including, for example, the free movement of workers and supranational enforcement via the 
CJEU – the EU’s offer to the EIA partner is almost bound to imply effectively less 
integration than the Single Market level in at least some (probably, most) sectors. Figure 2(B) 
sketches in a notional EIA agreement on the illustrative service trade.  
In assessing the compatibility of the EIA with GATS provisions, Article V(1) might seem to 
imply that in every covered sector the EIA must deliver liberalisation to something like the 
national level. However, Article V (1) requires the absence of discrimination ‘in the sense of 
Article XVII’, which arguably covers only a subset of the issues that may be covered by the 
                                                          
29 One is tempted to argue that the rights given to EU partners will never be less restrictive than those 
accorded to nationals. However, in at least one case outside trade, this is not true: the UK’s restrictions on 
residents bringing their non-citizen spouses into the UK are more restrictive than those it applies to nationals 
of other EU members! In the following analysis we ignore such perversities.  
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Figure 2: Levels of Restriction in a Single Services Sector 
(A)  At present    (B) Following a UK-EU EIA 
 
 
 
legal treatment of nationals or even of those covered in the Single Market. In other words, 
‘national treatment’ may entail a level of restriction above what we have termed ‘national’ or 
even above our ‘EU partners’ level. As we argue below, we do not have to settle this 
question, but for concreteness show the degree of liberalisation required of an EIA under the 
most demanding interpretation, labelling it as ‘maximal de jure Article V’. Clearly, on this 
basis, the EIA agreement for our illustrative sector would fail the test of eliminating existing 
discrimination.  
In presenting the EU-Korea FTA, however, the Secretariat declares that ‘the EU's 
commitments cover, at least partly, a large range of services sectors’ (paragraph 99) and that 
‘The list of commitments made by Korea …. covers, at least partly, most sectors’ (paragraph 
102). It then notes that ‘The specific commitments by the Parties in the Agreement are based 
on their GATS commitments, …. For certain sectors (and sub-sectors) coverage is enlarged, 
while, for a number of sectors (sub-sectors) already covered, new commitments are made or 
certain GATS-limitations are withdrawn’ (paragraph 104) and it ‘compares [the Parties' 
specific commitments] with their GATS schedules’ (paragraph 105).30 That is, the measure 
that the Secretariat uses for defining a sector as covered is that the EIA improves upon the 
GATS scheduled degree of restriction – i.e. that the distance we have labelled as the ‘de facto 
measure for Article V’ in Figure 2(B) exceeds zero. Given that no challenge has been made 
to the EU-Korea FTA, we might take it that its standard is acceptable to WTO members. 
Moreover, given that in most sectors EU and UK applied MFN policies are already more 
liberal than scheduled policies, even an EIA that merely committed to current applied levels 
would seem to satisfy the de facto standard.  
Given that nearly all sectors should meet the standard, there is ample cover for a few – or 
perhaps more than a few – to offer mutual access at the EU Partner (Single Market), level 
without violating the ‘substantially all sectors’ criterion. Figure 3 generalises Figure 2 to 
sketch a notional UK-EU EIA in services with seven illustrative sectors, ignoring strictures 
                                                          
30 It goes on to note that ‘Improvements in existing GATS commitments are either a reduction of the 
limitations applicable to market access and/or national treatment, a relaxation of the form of establishment 
under mode 3, further sub-sectors in which commitments are made, and/or additional commitments’ 
23 
 
about every mode of supply having to be included. Sector 1 is identical to that in figure 2, 
with differences between all five levels of regulation. Sector 2 is similar, but the UK and EU 
offer each other essentially the EU Partner level of access via harmonised regulations and 
mutual recognition.  In Sector 3 the EU partners face exactly the same restrictions as 
nationals, but this is not extended to the EIA, while in sector 4, little integration has been 
achieved and UK-EU mutual access is bound at applied MFN levels.  
 
Figure 3 A Notional UK-EU Sectoral Services Deal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even sector 4, however, appears to meet the WTO’s de facto standard because applied 
regulation is a little more liberal than the GATS schedule requires. The latter is also true of 
sector 5 but here there has been considerable Single Market liberalisation that has not been 
extended to the UK. In sector 6 both the Single Market and the EIA offer the same treatment 
as nationals receive, whereas in sector 7 the key feature is that neither MFN nor the EIA goes 
any further than the binding. Of all the sectors in figure 3, only sector 7 would de facto be 
considered ‘not covered’ in the EIA.  
The EU-Korea FTA appears to offer a strong precedent for a UK-EU EIA that, while 
comprehensive in coverage, offers significantly different degrees of integration in different 
sectors. Some of the obligations of this agreement, however, pose a very serious political 
      1            2              3              4             5              6             7         Sectors 
GATS Schedule        ;     Applied     ;       EIA         ; 
EU Partners                  ;       National   
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challenge for the EU. Articles 7.8.1 and 7.14.1 of the EU-Korea agreement state that for 
cross-border services trade and establishment respectively,  
unless otherwise provided for in this Article, each Party shall accord to services and 
service suppliers of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords to 
like services and service suppliers of any third country in the context of an economic 
integration agreement signed after the entry into force of this Agreement.   
In other words, whatever preferential treatment for services and service suppliers the EU 
grants to third parties must also be extended to Korea. The exception implied by the first 
phrase is that agreements with third parties may avoid such an MFN extension only if they 
achieve a significantly higher level of obligations than the EU-Korea FTA. More specifically 
such an agreement must constitute an ‘internal market’ on services and establishment, with 
the EEA listed as the sole exemplar, or ‘encompass both the right of establishment and the 
approximation of legislation.’ (Annex 7_B) 
In sum, these clauses mean that either an agreement between the UK and the EU has to be 
extended to Korea in these two critical areas of services trade, or that the UK and the EU 
have to agree that the agreement between them approximates legislation or amounts to an 
internal market with, inter alia, free movement of persons. These are not impossible goals but 
they mean that, in the relevant sectors, the UK will have to commit to a high degree of market 
integration with the UK.  
 
Conclusion 
WTO law and practice is not prohibitive of the successful conclusion of a UK-EU FTA/EIA 
that includes very deep integration in a number of sectors. However, it does impose some 
constraints. With respect to the elimination of tariff barriers, the parties cannot cherry-pick 
sectors but must maintain comprehensive coverage. This does not prevent coordinating 
external tariffs, and relaxing RoOs, in key sectors to replicate something like a customs union 
in those sectors. With respect to regulatory cooperation, if the EU and UK maintain some 
mutual recognition of each other’s technical regulation and/or CAPs, there is a risk of 
violating relevant WTO MFN provisions under certain scenarios. Yet the MFN obligation 
here is a procedural one: to cooperate with interested parties toward concluding MRAs.  
What is possible does not necessarily equate with what is desirable – the latter is for the EU 
and UK authorities to decide. However, we note that EU integration has strongly increased 
UK-EU27 trade flows and the development of integrated supply chains, and that physical 
proximity furthers these advantages. Imposing additional tariff barriers and customs 
procedures on existing value chains will be costly and disruptive. The agreement we have 
outlined in this paper is intended to preserve as much as possible of the mutual access that the 
UK and the EU27 currently offer each other. It needs for the sake of formality to be presented 
in the WTO relative to the MFN alternative of ‘no deal’.  However, the obvious way to try to 
negotiate it is from the other direction – to take the status quo as the starting point and ask 
how much change is required to accommodate each side’s red lines. This requires agreement 
in principle that a deep arrangement is sought, and working closely together to design the 
details to meet that objective.   
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The first step is to agree the simple tariff-free FTA. It would then be for the UK to decide to 
what extent it wished to coordinate its MFN and preferential tariffs with the EU. We have 
argued elsewhere that the UK should initially adopt the EU tariff schedule through a 
rectification at the WTO – UKTPO (2016) – but that is a short-term expedient. The decision 
here is a longer-run one, and it is in our view very finely balanced. If tariff coordination did 
seem desirable, work would then pass on to coordinating regulations and designing rules of 
origin and their administration in a way that minimised the customs burden. The latter can 
occur only once the UK has worked out its general customs regulations and procedures. Of 
course, these regulations should be as convenient as possible anyway, but we would expect 
that in the presence of coordinated policies, they could be made significantly easier to 
manage.  
Regarding regulation for goods, conformity assessments and services, it is relatively 
straightforward to convert existing harmonisation into MRAs, as compared to the usual 
situation in which trade partners have to build trust in divergent regulatory systems. The issue 
is how to enforce the agreed rules in the UK independently of the CJEU, and how to modify 
MRAs to reflect changing regulation. The UK as the smaller party would have to accept EU 
leadership in most standards, a voluntary reduction in regulatory self-determination in 
exchange for market access.   
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